Moneyball: Liverpool 2023/24 Financial Results

Welcome to the second essay in our Moneyball series, where we take a look at the business side of football. Last week we analysed Arsenal's financials, and today we are diving into Liverpool's numbers.

Liverpool Football Club recently published its financial results for the year ended 31 May 2024, revealing record revenues but a significant loss. Overall revenue reached £614 million, up £20 million from last year.

However, rising costs and the absence of Champions League football led to a pre-tax loss of £57 million, a sharp decline from the £9 million loss in the prior year​. This analysis breaks down the key metrics – revenue streams, profit/loss drivers, player trading impacts, commercial performance, and the club’s financial stability, and examines compliance with football’s financial regulations.

Liverpool’s revenues grew in 2023/24 despite a backdrop of reduced European income. The total revenue of £614 million was a club record, edging up from £594 million in 2022/23​.

This growth was driven by strong matchday and commercial performances, which outweighed a decline in broadcasting income:

• Matchday Revenue: Liverpool generated £102 million in matchday income, a £22 million (+28%) increase from the previous season​. This jump was fuelled by the expanded Anfield stadium and more home games. The new Anfield Road Stand opened during the season, boosting capacity to around 61,000 by Feb 2024 and contributing to higher gate receipts​.

  As a result, 2023/24 was the first time Liverpool’s matchday revenue surpassed £100 million​. The club now ranks among the top matchday earners in England, and with a full season of the expanded Anfield ahead, matchday revenue is expected to rise further.

• Broadcasting (Media) Revenue: Media income fell to £204 million, down £38 million (−16%) from 2022/23​. The primary reason was Liverpool’s participation in the UEFA Europa League instead of the more lucrative Champions League. In 2022/23, the club had reached the Champions League last 16, whereas in 2023/24 they played in the Europa League, which offers substantially lower prize and TV money​.

  According to the club, the Champions League absence had a “significant” financial impact, only partially offset by improved Premier League broadcasting payouts from a stronger league finish​. Despite the drop, the £204 million media revenue remains a major component of turnover, underlining the importance of European qualification to the club’s finances.

• Commercial Revenue: Liverpool’s commercial operations were the standout performer. Commercial revenue hit £308 million, rising by £36 million (+13%) year-on-year​. This is a record high for the club, marking the first time Liverpool’s commercial income has exceeded £300 million​. The growth was driven by new sponsorships and booming retail sales. In 2023/24 the club signed four new global partners – UPS, Google Pixel, Peloton, and Orion Innovation – and also renewed key deals with partners like Kodansha and Carlsberg​.
  
  Liverpool reported that its retail division achieved record sales across its stores (including a new outlet in Dublin) and e-commerce platform, which saw over one million app downloads​. The commercial strength reflects Liverpool’s global brand appeal, which the club notes is “phenomenal” and a foundation for continued revenue growth​. Commercial income now accounts for about 50% of total revenue, one of the highest proportions in the Premier League​.

Impact of European Participation: The contrast between Champions League and Europa League involvement is evident in the revenue mix. In 2022/23, Champions League participation had bolstered media revenues (total broadcasting was £242 million that year), whereas 2023/24’s Europa League run yielded far less. Swiss Ramble (a football finance analyst) estimated Liverpool’s Europa League payout at around £26.7 million – only a fraction of what Champions League contenders earned​.

Consequently, Liverpool’s broadcasting revenue dropped 7% year-on-year and overall revenue growth was limited. This underscores how vital Champions League football is to the club’s revenue: over the past five years Liverpool accrued roughly £400 million from UEFA competitions​, so a season outside the Champions League creates a noticeable shortfall. The club’s return to Champions League contention in the upcoming season should therefore provide a significant financial boost.

Despite record turnover, Liverpool’s profitability took a downturn due to higher costs and limited one-off gains, resulting in a second consecutive annual loss:

• Pre-Tax Loss: Liverpool posted a loss before tax of £57 million for 2023/24​. This is a considerable decline from the £9 million pre-tax loss in 2022/23​. In other words, the loss widened by £48 million year-on-year. The swing into a larger loss is attributed mainly to the reduced media revenue (−£38m) combined with rising expenses of a similar magnitude​. It’s noteworthy that Liverpool had been modestly profitable in years prior to 2022; the current figures represent a departure from that trend, highlighting how the cost base has grown faster than income in the short term.

• Operating Costs: Total administrative expenses jumped to £600 million, an increase of £38 million (+7%) from the prior year​. These costs include wages, player amortisation (transfer fee accounting), and other club overheads. The 2023/24 accounts also absorbed some one-off charges, notably a £9.6 million payoff to departing manager Jürgen Klopp and his coaching staff upon their exit at the end of the season​. Even though revenues grew by £20 million, the surge in costs more than offset the gains. As a result, Liverpool’s operating profit was negative, leading to the overall loss. In the previous year, the much smaller £9m loss indicated that revenue and costs were nearly in balance; in 2023/24 the gap widened substantially.

• Year-on-Year Highlights: Compared to 2022/23, the club enjoyed improvements in matchday and commercial profit contributions (thanks to higher income in those areas), but suffered declines in broadcasting margin and had generally higher expenses across the board. The fall in European income can be seen as “the clear cost of Champions League absence,” as one analysis put it​. In summary, while 2023/24 saw all-time high revenues, it also delivered a significantly worse bottom line than the previous year, emphasising the importance of cost control and high-margin revenue streams in the club’s financial model.

Player transfers plays an important role in a football club’s finances. For Liverpool, 2023/24 saw heavy investment in new players but relatively modest gains from player sales, which affected the profit outcome:

• Profit on Player Sales: Liverpool recorded approximately £22 million in profit from player sales in 2023/24​. This figure is notably down from about £34 million in 2022/23, a £12m decline​. The profit on disposals includes the sales of long-serving midfielders Fabinho and Jordan Henderson to Saudi clubs in summer 2023, as well as any fees from other outgoing transfers. Fabinho’s transfer reportedly brought in around £40m and Henderson about £12m, but several other departures (e.g. Naby Keïta, James Milner, Roberto Firmino, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain) were free transfers at contract end​.
  
  The result was that Liverpool’s overall profit on player trading was “lacklustre” by top-club standards​ – significantly lower than what rivals like Manchester City or Chelsea generate from sales. A £22m player-sale profit contributed some cushion to the accounts, but it was not nearly enough to counteract the £600m+ operating costs.

• Loan Revenues: Income from loaning out players was a minor factor. Liverpool did loan out a few squad players (for example, young defender Nat Phillips was loaned to Celtic and Fabio Carvalho to RB Leipzig during 2023/24), but any loan fees received were relatively small. The club’s financial report did not highlight loan income as a significant item, implying it is bundled into other revenue or “profit on disposal/loan” figures. In the prior year (2022/23), Liverpool’s accounts showed £33.8m from player sales (with no major mention of loan fees).

• Transfer Spending and Amortisation: On the other side of player trading, Liverpool invested heavily in new signings ahead of the 2023/24 season. The club spent an estimated £150–£200 million on incoming transfers, including midfielders Alexis Mac Allister (£35m), Dominik Szoboszlai (£60m), Wataru Endo (£16m), and Ryan Gravenberch (£34m)​. This squad rebuild drove up the club’s amortisation cost (the annual expense of writing down transfer fees over player contracts) to £114 million​, a slight increase from the previous year.
  
  While Liverpool’s amortisation is still lower than some Big Six rivals (Manchester United’s is £187m, Arsenal’s £171m, Chelsea’s well over £200m)​, it reflects the growing investment in players. The net effect is that Liverpool were net spenders in the transfer market in 2023/24, and the modest profit on player sales did not offset the depreciation of transfer fees on the books. This weighed on profitability, demonstrating that Liverpool’s recent losses are partly a result of conscious squad rebuilding without major sell-offs. The club will hope that on-pitch success from these signings, and potentially some profitable player sales in future, will justify this investment financially.

One of the most striking aspects of Liverpool’s 2023/24 accounts is the rise in the wage bill, which has implications for financial sustainability:

• Wage Costs: The club’s staff costs (primarily player and staff wages) reached £386 million for 2023/24​. This is an increase of £13 million (+3% in absolute terms, or +4% by the club’s calculations) from the previous year’s £373m. Wages now represent about 63% of Liverpool’s revenue​, which is a manageable level and in line with a sustainable target under football finance rules. However, the absolute wage figure is Liverpool’s highest ever and among the largest in the Premier League. Notably, this increase came despite the departure of several high-earning veteran players (Henderson, Fabinho, Milner, Firmino, Keïta, Oxlade-Chamberlain) during 2023​. One might have expected the wage bill to fall after shedding those salaries, but a few factors drove it higher:

  • Bonuses: Performance-related bonuses were triggered, including payments for Champions League qualification and a domestic cup victory in the prior season​. For example, even though Liverpool only reached the Champions League last-16 in 2022/23, qualifying for the competition and winning the 2022/23 Carabao Cup added bonus costs that were paid in the 2023/24 period.

  • New Signings and Contracts: The arrival of players like Mac Allister, Szoboszlai, Endo, and Gravenberch added substantial guaranteed salaries to the payroll​. Additionally, Liverpool renewed 11 player contracts during this period​, often on improved terms, which increased the wage commitments.

  • Wage Structure Changes: Analysts have observed that Liverpool’s wage structure has shifted towards higher fixed wages and fewer conditional bonuses. In recent years, Liverpool traditionally had incentive-laden contracts (especially for Champions League participation), but new deals – exemplified by Mohamed Salah’s latest contract – emphasise guaranteed compensation​. This means even in a season without Champions League play, the wage bill didn’t shrink as much as expected, because many wages are now locked-in rather than performance-based.

• Implications: At 63% of revenue, Liverpool’s wage-to-revenue ratio remains below the recommended upper limit (UEFA’s new rule is 70% for combined wages and transfers)​, so the club is not in an immediate danger zone. In fact, Liverpool’s ratio is healthier than some competitors, indicating a balance between spending on talent and income. However, the trend of rising wages is a concern – if revenues hadn’t grown, the ratio would be higher. The club’s CFO, Jenny Beacham, emphasised the need to continually grow income streams to support the increasing costs and “maintain financial stability”​. Essentially, Liverpool must keep expanding revenue through sponsorships, matchday, and regular Champions League football to afford its top-tier squad.
  
  The slightly elevated wage bill, alongside other costs, also squeezed the profit margins in 2023/24. Going forward, management will need to carefully monitor wages and perhaps resume a strategy of more performance-based pay, especially if the team ever misses out on Champions League revenue again. Nonetheless, as of 2023/24 the wage burden was “acceptable” at 63% of income​, and it underlines Liverpool’s commitment to investing in talent to remain competitive on the pitch.

Beyond operating profits, Liverpool’s financial health also depends on managing debt and finance costs. The 2023/24 accounts show a changing mix of borrowing but a relatively stable overall financial position:

• Borrowings: Liverpool’s total debt is comprised of bank loans and owner (inter-company) loans largely tied to stadium investments. During 2023/24, the club’s external bank debt decreased by around £10 million, falling to roughly £108–116 million outstanding​ by May 2024. A significant portion of this bank debt is financing for the Anfield Road Stand expansion (a project costing about £80–90m)​. Rather than taking a new loan for the expansion, the owners (Fenway Sports Group) utilised Liverpool’s existing credit facilities to fund the construction​, which the club is now repaying. On the other hand, inter-company debt owed to Fenway Sports Group rose to approximately £198 million​.
  
  This jump is related to a cash injection from the owners during the year: Liverpool received around £127 million from a minority investment (Dynasty Equity) in late 2023, which was channeled in as an inter-company loan from FSG​. Instead of immediately paying off the older £110m owner loan for the Main Stand, the new funds were used to “normalise” the club’s finances – essentially paying down more expensive external debt and funding capital projects (Anfield Road Stand completion and the Melwood training facility buyback)​. After these moves, Liverpool’s debt is more heavily weighted toward internal, owner-provided loans, which are typically low-interest or interest-free.

• Net Finance Charges: The club’s net finance costs (interest and related charges) for 2023/24 have not been explicitly stated, but given the debt structure, these costs remain modest relative to operating expenses. Interest on bank loans would form the bulk of finance charges – likely on the order of a few million pounds – as Liverpool’s interest-bearing bank debt (~£116m) was partially repaid and possibly refinanced at favourable rates before interest rates climbed. Meanwhile, the owners’ loans are believed to be either interest-free or at below-market rates, as Fenway Sports Group historically did not charge interest on the stadium redevelopment loans​.
  
  This means that the infusion of owner funds in 2023/24 likely helped reduce Liverpool’s interest expense by replacing some bank borrowing. Any net finance charge also includes things like bank facility fees or minor foreign exchange differences, but there were no indications of any unusual finance costs in 2023/24. In summary, Liverpool’s financing costs are under control – the club is not strained by interest payments, and the shift toward internal financing further eases the burden.

• Cash Position: Liverpool ended the 2023/24 financial year with cash reserves of about £7.5 million on hand​. This is a slight increase from the cash level a year prior, reflecting that the club maintained a relatively balanced cash flow despite the loss. The moderate cash balance is typical, as Liverpool tends to re-invest cash into player transfers and infrastructure. It’s worth noting that the injection from Dynasty Equity helped liquidity during the year; much of it was deployed to pay for the stadium build and other investments, rather than sitting as cash.
  
  The net debt, after offsetting the cash, stood at roughly £300 million in May 2024​. While this is a sizeable debt figure, the context is important: roughly two-thirds of that (£198m) is owed to the owners, not banks​. Having supportive owners who provide loans can be beneficial, as it gives the club flexibility in repayment and usually means less pressure from lenders. Additionally, these loans funded revenue-generating assets (Anfield’s expansion), which will pay off in the long run through higher matchday income. The remaining debt (~£108–116m bank debt) is very manageable given Liverpool’s annual EBITDA and the ongoing high demand for tickets and hospitality at Anfield. Overall, Liverpool’s balance sheet shows increased internal borrowing but a stable cash level, indicating that while the club has leveraged to invest in growth, it has done so in a measured way.

Despite posting losses in the last two seasons, Liverpool FC remains in compliance with all relevant financial fair play and sustainability regulations:

• Premier League Profitability & Sustainability (P&S) Rules: The Premier League allows clubs to incur a maximum aggregated loss of £105 million over a rolling three-year period (with certain adjustments for infrastructure and academy costs). Liverpool’s losses – £57m in 2023/24 and £9m in 2022/23, after a small profit in 2021/22 – are well within the permitted range. In fact, even counting some pandemic-affected results, Liverpool would be under the threshold. Financial analysts noted that the club is “under no threat” of breaching the Premier League’s P&S limits given its current three-year deficit​.
  
  The stability of Liverpool’s ownership and their prudent financial management contrasts with some rivals; for example, Manchester United’s heavier cost base and debt have led to drastic cost-cutting, whereas Liverpool can comfortably absorb a temporary loss. The Premier League has shown no concerns regarding Liverpool’s filings, and the club’s directors affirm that they operate within these rules.

• UEFA Financial Sustainability Rules: UEFA introduced new financial regulations in 2023 to replace the old Financial Fair Play (FFP) system. One key rule is the squad cost ratio, which limits clubs’ spending on player wages, transfers (amortisation), and agent fees to 70% of revenue (phased in: 90% in 2023, 80% in 2024, and 70% from 2025 onward). Liverpool is in a strong position under this rule. The club’s combined spending on wages and amortisation in 2023/24 is roughly £386m + £114m = £500m, which is about 81% of revenue. However, certain costs (like women’s football investment and infrastructure costs) are exempt, and the ratio was allowed to be up to 90% in this transitional year. More importantly, on a forward-looking basis, analysts estimate Liverpool’s squad cost ratio to be around 63%, well below UEFA’s 70% cap​.
  
  This 63% figure likely accounts for some adjustments and the fact that 2024/25 revenues will increase with Champions League income. It shows that Liverpool have headroom and are not at risk of violating UEFA’s spending limits. Additionally, UEFA still has a three-year break-even rule (with COVID-related add-backs) – Liverpool’s break-even status is solid given prior profits and manageable losses. The club’s CFO reinforced that “operating a financially sustainable club continues to be our priority” and affirmed Liverpool “will continue to operate in accordance with football’s financial rules and regulations”​. In practice, this means Liverpool is confident it meets all UEFA criteria and will pass club licensing checks without issue.

In summary, Liverpool is fully compliant with both Premier League and UEFA financial regimes. The current losses are within acceptable limits and the club’s cost ratios are below mandated ceilings. This compliance is crucial as it ensures no sanctions (such as fines or squad restrictions) will impede the club off the pitch. Liverpool’s disciplined approach – investing in growth but within its means – has maintained its status as a well-run club financially, even as it pursues success on the pitch.

The 2023/24 financial results for Liverpool FC paint a picture of a club at its commercial peak yet dealing with new financial challenges. Revenues reached all-time highs across matchday and commercial streams, underlining the strength of the Liverpool brand and fanbase. However, the absence of Champions League football revealed how much that elite European exposure matters – media revenues dipped and the club fell to a sizeable loss. Hefty spending on players and a rising wage bill contributed to costs outpacing revenue growth in the short term.

On the positive side, Liverpool’s investment in Anfield’s expansion and a robust sponsorship portfolio this year are strategic moves that should yield returns in coming seasons, especially with Champions League revenue set to return in 2024/25. The player trading contribution was modest in 2023/24, placing more onus on organic revenue to cover expenditures; this is an area the club may look to improve, perhaps by selling fringe players for profit in future windows.

Crucially, Liverpool remains on solid footing regarding financial sustainability. The ownership’s support – injecting funds and not demanding immediate returns – has allowed the club to strengthen infrastructure and manage debt without crippling interest costs. Both Premier League and UEFA financial rules are being comfortably met, validating the club’s prudent yet ambitious financial strategy.

Looking ahead, the return of Champions League competition, a full season of expanded Anfield capacity, and continued commercial momentum put Liverpool in a strong position to return to profitability in 2024/25. The challenge will be to maintain competitive spending on the squad while ensuring those investments translate into on-pitch success and further revenue – a balance Liverpool managed well in recent years.

Sources:

• Liverpool FC Official Statement – “LFC announces financial results for the 2023-24 season” (Feb 28, 2025)​.

• Reuters – Liverpool post pre-tax loss of £57m as increased costs offset revenue rise​.

• This Is Anfield (Press Association) – Liverpool announce £57m loss – cost of Champions League absence​.

• Sports Business Journal – Liverpool sees pre-tax loss, record commercial rev​.

• OneFootball (Mo Chatra & G. Cordell) – Liverpool’s 23/24 Accounts Unpacked​.

• Deloitte Football Money League 2025 data (via Reddit summary)​.